| Abstract: |
| Traditional selfish routing models in network flow typically focus on a single objective, such as travel time or distance, and are guided by the principle of user equilibrium (UE). However, real-world scenarios demand the consideration of multiple objectives, such as distance, travel time, and pollution. This paper addresses a bi-criteria problem where individual road users aim to minimize their travel time, conflicting with the collective objective of minimizing total fuel consumption. By adjusting `free` parameters, specifically speed limits, we explore how user behavior can be influenced to align better with the fuel consumption objective. Inspired by the Price of Anarchy (PoA) concept, which measures the suboptimality of equilibrium based on minimum total travel time, we classify equilibrium solutions using a weighted model that balances travel time and fuel consumption. Our results indicate that modest parameter adjustments can yield Pareto-improving solutions, demonstrating that while our equilibrium suboptimality measure reveals network inefficiencies, it may not fully capture solution quality when comparing different network configurations. |
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