Special Session 131: 

Aggregation in evolutionary Mean Field Games

Daniela Tonon
Paris Dauphine University
France
Co-Author(s):    Marco Cirant
Abstract:
In this talk we consider time-dependent viscous Mean-Field Games systems in the case of local, decreasing and unbounded coupling. These systems arise in mean field game theory, and describe Nash equilibria of games with a large number of agents aiming at aggregation, i.e. at converging to a common state. From the PDE viewpoint, several issues are intrinsic in this framework, mainly caused by the lack of regularizing effects induced by increasing monotonicity of the coupling. Non-existence, non-uniqueness of solutions, non-smoothness, and concentration are likely to arise. Even more than in the competitive case, the assumptions on the Hamiltonian, the growth of the coupling and the dimension of the state space affect the qualitative behavior of the system. We prove the existence of weak solutions that are minimisers of an associated non-convex functional, by rephrasing the problem in a convex framework. Under additional assumptions involving the growth at infinity of the coupling, the Hamiltonian, and the space dimension, we show that such minimisers are indeed classical solutions by a blow-up argument and additional Sobolev regularity for the Fokker-Planck equation. These results are obtained in collaboration with Marco Cirant.