| Abstract: |
| The exponential expansion of on-demand delivery services (Uber Eats, Deliveroo, Glovo) has introduced intricate market mechanisms where courier trustworthiness emerges as a pivotal yet ambiguous element. Newly onboarded couriers typically lack substantial track records; platform assessments depend heavily on perception rather than rigorous statistical validation; and reputation metrics remain vulnerable to malicious behavior.
This research introduces an innovative competitive equilibrium model grounded in uncertain variational inequalities, in which courier reliability metrics are represented as uncertain variables within Liu`s uncertainty framework. Couriers engage in spatial competition for zone assignments while satisfying probabilistic constraints that require minimum trustworthiness thresholds at predetermined confidence levels.
Our analytical approach transforms these uncertain restrictions into their deterministic counterparts using inverse uncertainty distributions, subsequently expressing the Nash equilibrium solution as a variational inequality problem. Computational simulations demonstrate how entry barriers tied to reputation scores influence both equilibrium resource distribution and platform efficiency.
The findings highlight that carefully tuned reliability thresholds combined with adaptive confidence-level adjustments serve as effective policy instruments for equitable market participation, yielding actionable insights for digital platform governance and economic regulation. |
|