| Abstract: |
| Green loan has attracted worldwide attention in recent years due to the increasingly striking environmental
problems caused by economic activities. This paper considers a game on the application of green
loans for technique innovation among the enterprises, banks and government, and addresses the
effectiveness of green loan and government subsidy on promoting clean production. Serial profit-risk
models are established and then solved according to the intention of enterprises to technique innovation
for promoting clean production. Energy emission is selected as a measure capturing the production
effects on environment in this paper. The conditions that enterprises execute technique innovation with
loans and that banks approve loans for enterprises are derived. Two threshold values on technique
maturity are presented to support these conditions. The most importantly, it is rigorously proved that
green loan subsidy provided by the government could improve environmental quality through reducing
the energy emissions from enterprises. It is also shown that subsidy not only improves the intention of
enterprises to technique innovation, but also increases the innovation risks. |
|